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that, despite the changing world, those
policies are just as good and just as effective today.
I had a part in setting up the North
Atlantic Treaty Organizatwn-a minor
part, because I served in the Houoe of
Representatives at that time-but there
are others here-! cannot name them
all-Senator AIKEN, Senator YOUNG,
Senator ELLENDER, Senator ANDERSON,
Senator McCLELLAN, and others, who
were in this Chamber when the great
debate occurred 21 years ago which, on
the basis of a congressional resolution,
called for an increase of from two to six
THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE divisions in Europe.
ACT
There was a question raised at that
The Senate continued with the con- time as to how long they would be there,
sideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to and I think the answer was "Not very
amend the Military Selective Service Act long; a few years."
As a matter of fact, I think it was
of 1967 · to increase military pay; to authorize' military active duty strengths Senator Robert Taft who raised that
for fiscal year 1972; and for other question in committee. But what we are
faced with now, in my opinion, is not
purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, first only the possibility of an indeterminate
let me thank all my colleagues on both stay of 525,000 U.S. military personnel
sides of the aisle for the very kind words and dependents, but maybe a permanent
they have ha~ to say about me.
stay.
Why should not the Europeans want
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, may we have order?
us to maintain this large force? Why
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate should they not want us to send our surwill be in order.
plus generals and colonels there? Why
Mr. MANSFIELD. Especially at the should they not want us to continue to
beginning of their speeches, sometimes carry the greatest share of the burdPnbefore, and sometimes toward the end, not alone in our defense, but primarily in
they told me they were going to vote their defense?
against the pending amendment. I apThf'Y are better off by fa1· th<~n this
preciate the good will and the good country. If mv memorv sf'rves me corwishes.
rectlv, our debt Is eoual to the combined
Mr. President, sometimes it takes a debts of all the other countries in the
sledge hammer to make an imprint and world. We have an un:emnlovrnent rate
place an issue on the table. I did raise of 6.1 percent and an Inflation rate of
this issue. I have l:leen raising it for 11 5.7 percent. That is tod:'ly. And I do n"t
years. I did not make the issue this time. want to look over my shoulder and thinlc
But the issue has been made, and re- that something that was good 20 or 25
gardless of the outcome of the vote to- years ago cannot necessarily undergo
night, it will not disappear. It will not a change today.
return to the cobwebs where it has rested
I am not a member of thP. old lru"'rd.
so peacefully for the past two decades There
is a chronolo!rlcal JZ'~D between me
and 1 year.
I shall try not to go back over what and the great maioritv Clf thP. people of
Nation who are under 30 YP"'rs of
I have already said, because, while the this but
there never will be a rredihilitv
debate has been considerate in part and age,
emotional in part, in my opinion it has gap if I can helD it, becR.Ul'e I wl'nt to
not been as practical as it might have join them in facinJZ uo to the world of
been. There has been no hint of an un- reality of todav, and I do not want to
derstanding from downtown or from live in the past. I do not w11nt to return
overseas. It was take it or leave it; and to the "gold old davs." I wRnt to face up
I am happy, speaking personally, that to the responsibilities which are ours, inwe are confronting this amendment on dividually and collectivelv, today.
.Does the Senate want to do something
an up-and-down basis on the merits and
unchanged. I have no regrets, no apolo- about this situation in NATO? I think it
gies, and no alibis, and I expect, at the does. I know it does. But the question is,
very least, to achieve a minimum of that will the Senate do something about this
which I set out to attain. This matter situation, which we all know calls for
now has been brought to the full atten- correction and which we all know will
tion of this administration as it was not be hidden under a shroud forever?
not in the previous Democratic adminis- Not from this week on.
trations. This issue has now come to the
It was interesting to read the report
attention of our NATO partners.
of the Committee on Armed Services,
It has come to the attention of the now on Senators' desks, and on paJZe 35
peoples who together comprise the 15- to find this item, under the heading:
Nation membership of the North At- "Army":
lantic Treaty Organization.
Second, th~re Is some reason to believe
What I have endeavored to do is to that there may be an excessive number of
move from the past into the present, supply and logistics personnel In the U.S.
forces in Europe. The Defense Departand to look to the future. What I have Army
ment has Itself recently conducted a review
tried to do is not to look over my shoul- of
these units and has reduced authorized
der in order to hang on to policies which streng.t h in them by several thousand. But
were good two decades ago, and think the Committee-
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That is the Armed Services Committee, which is in control of the bill now
before usbelieves there could be room for some further
reductions. The detailed material in this
area is highly classified but It should be
noted that the United States cannot be expected to maintain a large supply and logistlCs base in Europe to supporL hostilities for
a long period of time when our allies are
showing, by their stores of supplies and
ammunition, that they cto not Intend to
maintain the logistics base necessary for such
lengthy hostilities.

That is the end of the quotation from
the report accompanying the bill now before the Senate for its consideration.
Mr. President, the Senate confronts an
issue of immense importance. The outcome may well affect this Nation's postW'e not only with regard to Europe but
also, to a great extent, to its role around
the globe. In a very real sense, the Senate is today looking to the years ahead
and to the policies and positions that
will be relevant and productive. To be
sure, what was done in the past was relevant and productive. But the time has
come, in my judgment, to stlike a course
that will free us from certain shackles
forged originally to bind us to policies
and positions that have lost their meaning.
In cutting by one-half the level of U.S.
forces in Europe, the amendment is de~
signed to put U.S. troop levels there into
a contemporary perspective. Needless to
say, I have been impressed by the intensity of comment which this proposal has
"prompted. It is a healthy sign of interest
in our European policies--policies which
have indeed suffered great neglect during these past several years of tW'bulence
in Southeast Asia.
At the outset, I would like to note my
respect for the alTay of statesmen who
have spoken out on this matter. Many
of them, in my opinion, will be judged
exceedingly well by history. It was 20
years ago, in a tim~ of ominous cold war
tension, that many of them forged the
powerful shield behind which West European recovery was allowed to proceed
securely. Their voices spoke then to a
world still shaken in the wake of a long
and devastating war. Their voices have
been revitalized today, Mr. President. But
the world they address is quite different.
Europe's economic and social recovery
has been remarkable; many of its members are in a stronger position than we,
and all are capable of doing far more
than their present effort if they really
believe ·their secm·ity is in danger.
We no longer perceive a monolithic
Communist bloc arrayed solidly against
us.
China and Russia now present the
greatest threat tx> each other's security.
The Iron Curtain has parted in many
places, and relations between East and
West Europe are rapidly improving.
I cite these as a few examples of
change. In spite of the changes, however,
our NATO commitment of force today 1s
not substantially less than when the Alliance was entered 20 years ago. Indeed,
consideling the awesome might of our
tactical nuclear weaponry, it is far
grewter. One final thought on this, Mr.
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President. I would just say 1hat nostalgia
for great achievements in the past cannot replace constructive approaches to a
foreign policy designed for the future.
It should be clearly explained, first of
all, that it is not suggested by this
amendment that we lei down our defenses or abandon Western Europe. It is
only suggested that we not remain frozen
in an unrealistic and outdated posture;
one that serves only to weaken us as a
Nation. It is suggested that at long last
we face up to the matter of reducing to
realistic proportions our ganison in Europe along the lines recommended 10
years ago by Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Oh, but the same voices are heard expressing the same reasons. First, they
exclaim that the possibility of detente
will be jeopardized. But what has improving East-West relations to do with the
present bloated level of U.S. farces in
Europe? What is to prevent us from relaxing tensions if the fat is squeezed out
of the military garrison there? What has
the precise figure of 300,000 U.S. military
personnel along with their 225,000 dependents to do with easing tensions?
Why not more? Why not less? Indeed,
have not the West European nat10ns done
very well themselves in easing EastWest tensions without much concern for
the number of forces they have contributed to NATO? France has none. Germany has fewer than it pledged. The
United Kingdom has cut to the bone, and
Canada is well on her way out.
It all adds up to this Nation ca.rrying
a very one-sided financial burden for
NATO long past the time when the burden of financial exchange shifted against
us. In reply, it is said that the Europeans
are making an effort. They are attempting to defray these ba!ance-of-payments
losses. It was stated that through agreements the Germans were purchasing
quantities of U.S. equipment which, to a
large degree, "offset" our expenditure in
Germany But the so-called "offset" program just does not withstand close
scrutiny.
This policy, Mr. President. began in
the early 1960's. Formal offset agreements have been in effect only between
ourselves and West Germany, the recipIent of the bulk of our NATO related
expenditures. While the term "offset" is
bandied about, it is understood that a
substantial portion of the purchases are
purchases which the Germans would
have made here in the United States,
anyway. In fact, it has been disclosed
that in the beginning years of these arrangements, several weapons systems--a
large portion of offset sales--had actually been contracted for prior to the Kennedy administration. This kind of "offset" is not my idea of a genuine extra
effort which truly attempts to make up
for our current heavy NATO burdens.
By 1967, I might add, we adopted the
temporary expedient of medium term
securities, which, of course, only deferred
the problem of our outlays. Moreover, the
accumulation of such loans will in time
only result in further German claims
against our financial stability.
The newest chapter, Mr. President, involves a European willingness to defray
directly about $200 million a year of our

NATO expenditures in Europe. I suggest
that when such an agreement is consummated, the balance of payments outflow from NATO may well have reached
$2 billion. In this regard, the news on
Monday about the first quarter balanceof-payments def.cit is most alarming.
If one were really serious about insisting upon an equitable burden sharing
within NATO, one would demand that
our allies pick up the full amount of these
expenditures, not a token 10 percent as is
now mentioned. As has been pointed out,
to reduce our real NATO budget, we need
direct payments. Much more basic to the
issue, however, is the fact that the idea
of genuine burden sharing is but a pious
hope. It was mentioned 20 years ago
and has been talked about ever since. If
burden sharing were the only issue here,
then why not take congressional action
with teeth in it: why not enact legislation that would require a full contribution from our allies? Let the European
pocketbook determine how critically the
Europeans view the presence of these
300,000 American servicemen with their
225,000 dependents.
Though exceedingly important in the
context of this debate, money is not the
only question at stake. There has been
the modified Mathias proposal; the Nelson proposal, the Dominick proposal, the
Bayh proposal, the Percy proposal, and
others; some emerged, some emerging
and perhaps some yet to emerge. Though
to varying degrees, most of these alternatives recognized the necessity for
change; none I say, most respectfully,
were willing to make the adjustment in
clear and direct fashion. Indeed, most
called for less than what 50 or more of
my colleagues in the Senate in the past
have called upon the Executive to dothat is, to achieve a substantial reduction of U.S. troops in Europe. Most of
the alternatives, be they perfecting
amendments or substitute amendments,
asked for consultations and negotiations.
But we have consulted and we have negotiated this question year after year
after year. There were calls, too, for
progress reports by the President. But
the President has reported. And progress
has never proceeded. Time and time
again we have admonished our allies to
bear a fair share of the NATO burden;
we have advised them about gaps in our
planning assumptions and conventional
forces; we have warned about the consequences if they were not prepared to
pull their own car. I submit that most
of these alternatives--as modified or
otherwise-merely asked that we embark
on several more years of fruitless negotiations. I submit that no action on our
part will meet with allied approval, no
matter how much consultation; no matter how much negotiation. We have already paid too big a price for delaying
this question with negotiations and
consultations.
And what have negotiations and consultations wi~h the West Europeans
wrought for our agricultural community? My colleagues in this Chamber
representing agricultural States understand the problem only too well. It is
simply time to indicate to the Europeans
that we will stand firm for our interests;
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all of our interests. But, no, they say any
adjustment downward of our European
garrison somehow affects adversely every
other part of the globe.
Most notable is the warning that the
amendment would impair the Middle
East situation. I am frankly impressed
with the sudden revelation to officials in
the Government who for years have had
difficulty seeing any serious Soviet threat
to Israel. Suddenly they have seen the
light and now urge opposition to the
amendment because it alledgedly would
hinder our abllity to aid Israel and would
strengthen the Soviet hand in the Middle East.
Mr. President, this claim is just not
supported. The key to our air capability
in the Mideast, in turn, is noL our Army
in southern Germany. It is the airbases
in Turkey, in Greece, and in Italy, for
which we pay no small sums in terms of
aid.
But finally, we are told that unilateral
reduction of our NATO forces would
doom prospects of a complementary reduction of Warsaw Pact armies. It is said
that if the amendment were adopted we
could "kiss that possibility goodbye."
Mr. President, that is just not so.
Panoting it in one editorial or a hundred
does not make it so. It is unfounded first
of all, to suggest that U.S. NATO troop
reductions provide the exclusive incentive to East European troop reductions
by the Soviets. It is no secret, for instance, that Russia's need to strengthen
its forces in the Far East continues more
than ever today. At the same time, Russia continues to follow us in the costly
and ever spiraling strategic arms race.
And, no less than we, are the Soviets
aware of the demands made by their
entire defense budget upon the domestic
economy.
For all of these reasons-but primarily
because of the tensions in the Far EastMoscow has a very great incentive indeed
to reduce its Warsaw Pact forces and
redeploy them eastward.
What makes the Russians hesitate?
Clearly the dominant reason is the
problem of political control in Eastern
Europe. As Czechoslovakia revealed all
too plainly, such control still rests ultimately on military might. If Soviet
planners find their Far East concerns
sufficiently pressing, some reduction in
Eastern Europe no doubt would be risked.
Otherwise such a reduction is unlikely
under any circumstances.
So how does the size of NATO's army
fit into this picture? I suggest, Mr. President, that cutting our Seventh Army
forces is an equally reasonable way to
induce the Soviets to reduce their manpower in the satellites. I suggest such a
cut on our part would act as effectively
to obtain this end as would any force
reductions reached mutually through
long drawn-out negotiations. It is clear,
too, that with a substantial reduction of
our NATO contingent, the willingness of
Eastern Europe to tolerate an undiminished Soviet presence would be sharply
reduced. Russia would be hard put to
explain why it was necessary to retain
such large forces to protect the satellites
against a pruned-back NATO.
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Indeed, it would not even be improbable to suggest that if one were a Soviet
leader this past weekend, worried about
the prospect of such satellite pressure,
one might well have sought to defer any
action on United States-European troop
strength by calling for long, drawn-out
negotiations.
Another factor in Soviet reluctance to
reduce its forces may actually be its assessment of the NATO threat. Many So\iet experts argue persuasively that Russia's foreign policy remains a mixture of
aggressive and genuinely defensive attitudes. To the extent that this, too, is a
factor in Soviet reluctance to reduce its
Warsaw forces, a unilateral reduction by
the United States cou'd be a positive
factor in a Soviet willingness to make a
suitable response.
But, it will be said by some, what of the
deep fear of Western Germany? The argument goes that with a reduced restraining presence of American forces,
Germany may seek to expand its own
military power. It is this fear that would
harden Russia's present position in Europe. This is pure speculation. Not only
does it ignore the fact that Bonn has no
financial stomach for substantial military
enlargement, but it also denies the growing preeminence of West Germany in the
Common Market and its desire to retain
its strong ties to the West and its eagerness for trade ties with the East.
But even if I am wrong, that is no
argument for hoping that simultaneous
force reductions would result from negotiations. If in fact Soviet reluctance to
reduce its forces is dominated by fear
of a nuclear West Germany unrestrained by our presence, then it will be
no more anxious to reduce its position
in Central Europe through mutual force
reduction talks. If the real problem is
fear of a nuclear West Getmany, let us
address that problem, and not talk about
peripheral issues. In Southeast Asia we
have learned too well the painful consequences of failing to face up to and
correct bad policy. We have busied ourselves debating the more superficial issues. On this matter, we need to clear
the air with constructive action.
Paring the issue down to its simplest
terms, no case has been made that a
reduction in half of our NATO forces
would endanger the physical security
of Western Europe. Why, it is asked in
turn, should a unilateral effort to deescalate this European garrison be rejected? I do not oppose good faith talks
with the Soviets or with anyone else.
Indeed, the Nelson amendment would
have paved their way. But since the Soviets do have considerable independent
mcent1ve to achieve force reductions on
their own, what is so necessary about
moving simultaneously? Our initiative
would be a reduction, not an escalation
of forces. Our initiative would ease tensions, not aggravate them. Our initiative
would enhance, rather than dimini~h.
the prospects f{)r eventual mutual troop
reductions in NATO.
In summary, I would only stress again
that this troop reduction amendment
does not seek the end of NATO. It seeks
only to reduce t', ~ size of the United
States garrison in Europe. H seeks only

to bring this Nation's fmancial contribution to the NATO cause somewhat
closer into line with that of other members.
It will not compel the complete withdrawal of the United States from Europe. Indeed, n may help to prevent it. As
I see it, the current financial crisis is
only the handwriting on the wall on that
score. It warns that our political and
military role abroad which was established in another time and circumstances
is not properly adjusted to current needs.
The adjustment is long past due in
Europe. Unless it is made, I fear that all
of our overseas commitments--the essential, indeed, the vital-along with the
superfluous, the antiquated, the irrelevant and the redundant, will be endangered.
This Government--the President and
the Congress together-would be well advised in my judgment to update these
commitments in concept and content.
We need to look at Europe as it is today
not as ~t was a quarter of a centtlry ago:
not as 1t was at the time of Korea when
the present size of the U.S. garrison in
Western Europe was first established, at
which time, incidentally, we first developed an interest in Southeast Asia-specifically in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
As the Senate commences to vote on
this issue, I would only ask that each
Senator consider the effect of the outcome not in terms of what was right for
yesterday, but rather in the context of
what is needed for today and tomorrow.
Mr. President, may I say in conclusion
that I have asked no Senator, not one
Senator, to vote for the pending amendment; nor do I intend to do so now.
The Senate is made up of mature inclj,..
viduals who represent sovereign States.
Each Senator is capable of making up
his own mind on the basis of the issue
which confronts us at this time.
As I said, I have no regrets and will
have none, regardless of the outcome
I will have no alibis. I will admit no mis~
takes in this case. If the amendment is
defeated, so be it. If otherwise, there will
be no sense of personal triumph may
I emphasize. The issue has been ;aised
and the raising of this issue is a matte;
of moment for th:i:s body, for this Government, for our people, and for those
of us who belong to the NATO organization.
May I say that, as far as the Senate is
concerned, in my opinion, nobody is going
to take us to the cleaners. If we are taken
in, we will be taken in by ourselves. We
will have nobody to blame but ourselves.
And, if we are, it will be too bad.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Who yields
time?
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l\1IKE MANSFIELD'S WELCOME HERESY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield to the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the
RECORD, immediately following my remarks, an article in yesterday's Evening
Star by Tom Wicker, entitled "Mike
Mansfield's Welcome Heresy."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :

(By Tom Wicker)
Sen. Mike l\Innsfield of Mont~ma has done
us al! a sei-vice. II1s propo":J.l i o fore" a 50
percent rcduc~wn In American forces in
Europe hn.s made it clear 11ow difficult it is in
this counry to chango a policy that hns
achieved institutional stntuG, no matter how
little sense the policy may have come to
make.
Mansfield's welcome Heresy f\lso has exposed the extent to which American foreign
policy-making Is dependent, not just upon
the standards and concerns but even upon
the personalit.lcs of the past. For not since the
Grand Army of the R.epubllc held Its last encampment has there been such an ingathering of elders and bygoners as President Nixon
has mobllized in support of he proposition
that NATO must never-no, never-be reconsidered like any other question of priorities.
Never mlnd the crumbling and festering
American city; never mind the mounting demands for tax dollars for education, health,
transportation, welfare, job training; never
mind the cost of mnintaining a half-mlllion
persons, including dependents and 12C genera.J.s, as well as 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons, in Europe; never mind the internn~lonal
payments deficit to which this endless commitment annua,lly ~ontrlbu~es $1.8 blllion..
Never mind aJ.1 that; the wisdom of the
ages says NATO must go on essentla.J.Iy untouched.
One primary argument against Mansfield's
p=oposal is that since NATO is an alliance,
the United Stat~s must not proceed unilaterally but only in concert with the other
parties.
The record shows, unfor~unately, that the
French have pulled out, the Portuguese have
their forces on ctuty maintaining their African empire, Britain has eliminated conscription, Canada hac cut its Enropean contingent, etc., ad innfinitium. Who's unilateral?
And who has borne the bulk of the load for
two decades, with precious little help in
sight?
The other argnment is that Mansfield's
proposal would sabotage any effort to follow
up Brezhnev's sugg~stion that a reduction
of forces and armaments 'n Europe might be
negotiated by the NATO and WP.rsn.w Pact
countries.
0! course, when Brezllnev naid something
about like that last yea!", nothing came of it.
And the major reason Washington seems
more interested this time vround !;; because
'the Brezbnev proposal provides a handy argument again.st Mancfield's amendment.
In fact, Nixon has made such a. concerted
effor~ne of the most vigorous of his administration-to defeat the Mansfield
amendment oecause of the internal power of
a policy long <!Stabllshed, j)articularly when
those who est:o.bl!ahed it v.rc st!ll around to
defend their handiwork.
There is nothing to suggest that, before
Mansfield acted, the adminintration had any
great plans for negotiating troop reduction,
either with the allies or the Soviets; and
many of the patriarchs wllo were rushed into
the breach have also opposed other movements in the glacier of East-West relations-say, Chancellor Er~ndt's efforts to begin Soviet-German reconciliation.
So the truth iG that, fer from being the
disaster pictured at the White House, Mike
Mansfield's amendment (which comes 26
years after World War II ended and only
after he failed to stir three admin!atratlons
with milder proposa.J.s) not only shown us
something about the viscid sense of priority
and reality in government, it may also force
some action at least, even 1t it is defeated
this week.
Having insisted that the Mansfield amendment would kill any chance to negotiate. reductions with the Soviets, the administration
can hardly fall now to make e. ser!oUB etrort to
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I have given a great deal of thought
to the understandable concerns of Senators. I have considered and reconsidered both the perfecting amendment and
the substitute amendment. It seems to
me that the perfecting amendment, the
Nelson amendment, as modified on yesterday, deals very effectively with the
concerns. Clearly, however, it will not
produce the U.S. troop reductions as
as the original amendment.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the promptly
It is my personal judgment now as it
Washington Post of June 20, 196~, on has
been for some years that the U.S.
page 8 there is an art1cle headed Kis- contingent
in Europe ought to be resinger -" not Henry, but the Chancel- duced without
delay. It ought to be relor-"Urges Europe Defend Self."
with or without negotiations and
Then under a dateline from Bonn, duced
Germ~y. June 19, AP, "Chancellor Kis- quite apart from considerations of the
financial situation". It is a
singer told the German Congress ye.ster- international
day that it is a disgrace that Amencans matter of principle; in my personal
must defend Europe.'' Descnbmg the judgment, these troop reductions have
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as been desirable and are desirable now in
the "optimum political solution" for West the interests of this Nation. In my per. sonal judgment, moreover, the cuts can
Germany, Kissinger asked:
Is it not a disgrace that 200 million Ameri- be made now without doing violence in
any way to our commitment to the Atcans must protect 300 million Europeans?
lantic Treaty or the opportunities for a
Mr. President, this was handed to me negotiated detente. Excess, waste or obby a friend this morning. I had no solescence in the U.S. troop commitments
knowledge of it before. If I had seen it in under the North Atlantic Treaty, as I
the press, I had overlooked it. Mr. Presi- see it, are not bargaining chips in negodent, for the past week we have heard tiations; they are as an albatross around
the wailing of Cassandra from down- the neck of the Nation's basic policies.
town, uptown, on this floor, and from
That is my personal judgment and the
overseas. We have read it in the press. original amendment was a legislative exWe have heard it from the mouths of pression of that judgment. Other Memhorses, so that we should be shaking in bers see it differently, a situation not unour boots and we should be fearful that common in the processes of the Senate.
if we do' anything, the foundations of
The authors of the pending perfecting
NATO will not only be shaken, but, amendment clearly see it differently and,
loosened, and finally will crumble.
therefore, they would put off a legislated
Mr. President, we have listened to a cut a while longer. For the present, they
considerable debate since the amend- would entreat the President most earment for U.S. troop reduction in Europe nestly by this amendment to enter into
was introduced. It has been an informa- negotiations with a view to mutual Easttive debate which-has been interspersed West troop reductions-a step, in any
with an input of additional ideas. I be- event, which there is every indication
lieve there is much sympathy with the that the ex'ecutive branch is now prepurposes of the original amendment even pared to take after years of reticence.
as there are conce1ns about some of its May I say that is all to the good. The
implications. If I read the latter cor- advice of the Senate or the Congress in
rectly, they have mostly to do with a pos- a matter of this kind is most proper in
sible loss of whatever opportunity for a a constitutional sense; it has been ofmutual troop reduction may have been fered many times to many Presidents.
opened by the Brezhnev proposal of
What impresses me even more in the
several days ago.
pending perfecting amendment, however,
Properly, Senators are considerate of as distinct from the proposed substitute
the President's constitutional preroga- which is to come later, is that this
tives which may be involved in this mat- amendment would also provide, as does
ter. By the same token, however, Sen- the original, for legislated troop reducators are not unaware of the constitu- tions, although, on a very gradual basis.
tional responsibilities of the Senate. One Specifically, the reduction under the perof those responsibilities is to provide for fecting amendment would be to 250,000
the maintenance of U.S. military forces by the end of fiscal year 1972; to 200,000
in such circumstances and only in such by the end of fiscal year 1973; and, ficircumstances that the Congress may nally, to 150,000 by June 30, 1974.
This provision, may I say, would be a
find appropriate. If I am not mistaken,
most of the Members of the Senate wish most proper exercise of the constitutional
to bring about a reduction in the cost authority of the Congress· regarding
and size of the U.S. deployment in maintenance of the Armed Forces. Of
Europe under NATO. I am aware that course, the President may disagree with
there is concern, however, lest the reduc- the proposed approach; indeed, he may
tion proposed in the original amendment express that disapproval by veto in the
is too drastic and precipitous and so, up- end. But the responsibility is in the Conset what is certainly a cornerstone of gress, at this time, and specifically in
U.S. foreign policy-the North At- the Senate. The responsibility to decide
lantic Treaty. I stress the treaty which on troop reduction rests with the Senate
is fundamental to policy as distinct from at this point and now with the agents and
NATO which is but the established mili- drummers of the executive branch. The
tary mechanism derived from the treaty executive branch should no more presume
20 years ago in order to meet the situ- to direct us in this matter than we should
ation then prevailing.
presume to direct the President in con-

get such negotiations going; if it refuses to
do so or if it backs off from any effective
agree~ent, Mansfield and his supporters wl.ll
be strengthened in future demands for unilateral reductions.
As the senator says of his amendment, "if
defeated, it will not be dead." That means the
issue is going to be forced-which, sadly
enough, is about the only way issues ever get
dealt with around here, in any admmtstration.
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ducting negotiations with the Soviet
Union if he chooses to enter into them.
And I must say that I am somewhat pertm·bed by the cavalier treatment of this
fundamental constitutional distinction
during the past few days.
In my judgment, the perfecting
amendment goes far to accommodate
any reasonable needs of the President
in the conduct of negotiations on troop
reductions. It offers to suspend the operation of the first cut in forces, and
along a well-defined formula, which
would otherwise be to 250,000 by June 30,
1972, if by the end of this year, negotiations are under way between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. If these
talks are once begun, there will be no
legislated reductions of U.S. forces whatsoever under this proposal for the next
2 years. That would not preclude the
President, of course, from acting on his
own to make a drawdown at any time he
sees fit.
To me, Mr. President, this proposal
commends itself to Senators who are prepared to see the general purposes of the
troop reduction amendment realized but
at a much slower pace and after still one
more effort to bring off effective EastWest negotiations on mutual reductions.
It is an ingenious attempt to reconcile
the constitutional responsibilities of the
President and the Congress in a reasonable fashion.
I reiterate that the amendment does
not bring about very promptly what I
believe to be a most desirable adjustment in our military deployment in Europe. It does, however, go beyond the expression of a sense of the Senate which
is the substance of the substitute amendment coming later and by means of which
many of us thought, fruitlessly, to bring
about a troop reduction in past years.
The pending amendment has teeth in
that it does put a legislative deadline on
further Executive delays in this matter,
even if the deadline is distant. I sho\.lld
think that its passage would not inhibit
the Congress from subsequently moving
up that deadline if future circumstances
should so indicate.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3
minutes to the Senator from Alabama.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I thank the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. President, I oppose the Mansfield
amendment, but I do believe that the distinguished majority leader should be
givel'l the right to have his amendment
voted up or down by the Senate.
I believe 1;hat w1less any amendment
to the Mansfield amendment is a vast
improvement over the Mansfield amendment it, too, should be rejected.
Therefore, feeling that the Nelson
amendment is not an improvement on
the Mansfield amendment I will oppose
the Nelson amendment, as well.
The Mansfield amendment demobilizes
no one; all it does is to seek the transfer
of 150,000 of our soldiers. Already the
number of men in the armed services is
decreasing sensationally from around 3,500,000, which was the number on July 1,
1968, to around 2,700,000 now. Under the
terms of the draft extension bill, the

